We reconsider the role of an in ‡ation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and …scal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, in ‡ation conservatism causes …scal overspending.
Introduction
The problem of designing institutional frameworks that cope best with discretionary behavior of policymakers has received much attention following the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) . In particular, to overcome the in ‡ationary bias caused by discretionary conduct of monetary policy, Rogo¤ (1985) proposed appointing a conservative central banker, who dislikes in ‡ation more than society does. Recently in Adam and Billi (2008) we have shown in ‡ation conservatism à la Rogo¤ also to be desirable when …scal policy is endogenous and equally subject to a commitment problem. By introducing distortionary taxation into the setting, in this paper we show that the desirability of in ‡ation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions.
We consider, in particular, two policy regimes under discretion. In one, the two authorities decide policy at the same time (simultaneous policy regime). In the other, …scal policy is determined before monetary policy (…scal leadership regime). The main result is that in ‡ation conservatism pays o¤ overall, even though excessive concern about in ‡ation may be harmful, depending on the policy regime. In particular, full conservatism, which implies zero in ‡ation in equilibrium, is optimal only in the case of …scal leadership, arguably the most plausible assumption. Instead, the optimal degree of conservatism in the case of simultaneous policy, though substantially high, is less than full.
The intuition is the following. In the simultaneous policy regime, the …scal instruments are not observed when the monetary instrument is set. In contrast, under …scal leadership, the central bank can condition the nominal interest rate on …scal policy and she does so in a way that depends on her preferences for in ‡ation. Under full conservatism, in ‡ation is completely stabilized at zero. Therefore, a surge in public spending is followed by a strong monetary policy tightening and, as a consequence, the …scal policy maker correctly perceives the trade-o¤ between public consumption and private consumption, implied by the production function and 2 the resource constraint. Then, the Ramsey plan is implemented even if the …scal policy maker lacks the ability to commit to future policies. The whole mechanism breaks when the central bank moves at the same time as the …scal authority, since the nominal interest rate cannot be contingent on public expenditure. Rather, the low in ‡ation rate implied by conservatism can be harmful, because it reduces the marginal cost of a further increase of government expenditure, in terms of in ‡ation. It follows that the optimal degree of conservatism under a simultaneous policy regime has to solve a trade-o¤ between high in ‡ation and high public expenditure. The solution to the trade-o¤ is less than full conservatism.
Relative to the existing literature, the paper shows that the presence of distortionary taxation signi…cantly worsens the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and government expenditure in the simultaneous policy regime. As a consequence, full conservatism is not necessarily optimal in such case. This conclusion partially overturns the result in Adam and Billi (2008) .
When the government expenditure is …nanced with lump-sum taxation, as in that paper, full conservatism is always optimal, irrespective of the policy regime. Adam (2011) studies how the level of government debt a¤ects optimal policies under commitment. Finally, Niemann (2011) studies how di¤erent levels of government debt a¤ect the desirability of monetary conservatism under discretion in a ‡exible price economy. If the government issues nominal debt, as in his setting, the high debt tolerance implied by full conservatism can be harmful.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 explains the policy regimes. Section 4 presents the policy evaluation. And Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains technical details.
The model
We generalize the setting of Adam and Billi (2008) to a case in which public spending is …nanced with a distortionary income tax.
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There is a continuum of identical households with preferences given by The household chooses e P t and then hires labor e h t so satisfy product demand,
where z t is an aggregate technology shock. The shocks t and z t evolve according to independent AR(1) stochastic processes with autocorrelation coe¢ cients and z and steady state values z = 1 and < 1. Following Rotemberg (1982) , we assume quadratic resource costs of adjusting prices, where > 0 indexes the degree of price stickiness.
The budget constraint of the household is then
where R t denotes the gross nominal interest rate, B t are nominal bonds paying R t B t in period t + 1, w t is the real wage paid in a competitive labor market, and t is a labor income tax.
We assume bonds are in zero aggregate net supply. And we rule out Ponzi schemes.
Thus, the household's problem consists of choosing {c t ; h t ; e h t ; e P t ; B t } 1 t=0 to maximize (1) 1 We assume u( ) is separable and increasing in c and g but decreasing in h. 4 subject to (2) and (3) taking as given {y t ; P t ; w t ; R t ; g t ; t } 1 t=0 . The …rst-order conditions of this problem are (2) and (3) and
where r t = e P t =P t denotes the relative price and t = P t =P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate. In addition, the usual transversality condition holds.
The government consists of two independent authorities, namely a monetary authority setting R t and a …scal authority choosing g t in each period t. The government is assumed to operate under a balanced budget
We consider a symmetric price-setting equilibrium in which r t = 1 for all t. The …rst-order conditions of the household's problem can then be condensed into two equilibrium conditions, i.e., a Phillips curve
and a consumption Euler equation
Conveniently, these two equilibrium conditions do not make reference to t and w t . 2 Thus, 2 Equations (4) and (5) an equilibrium in the private sector consists of a plan fc t ; h t ; t ; R t ; g t g 1 t=0 satisfying (5)- (7) and the market-clearing condition
3 The policy regimes
As a benchmark in the policy evaluation, we use the optimal Ramsey plan, i.e., the optimal commitment policy determined at time zero. The Ramsey planner chooses fc t ; h t ; t ; R t ; g t g 1 t=0
to maximize (1) subject to (6)- (8). We assume that the government authorities cannot abide to the Ramsey plan and instead re-optimize in each period. In such a setting, we consider two policy regimes.
Simultaneous policy. In the …rst regime, the authorities make decisions at the same time in each period. The government in period t has to choose (c t ; h t ; t ; g t ; R t ) to maximize
(1) subject to (6)- (8), a …scal reaction function, a monetary reaction function, and taking as given fc t+j ; h t+j ; t+j ; R t+j ; g t+j g for j 1.
In particular, the …scal reaction function represents the optimal strategy from the point of view of the …scal authority in period t, who takes R t as given. The …scal authority has to choose (c t ; h t ; t ; g t ) to maximize (1) subject to (6)-(8) taking as given fc t+j ; h t+j ; t+j ; R t+j 1 ; g t+j g for j 1. 4 Instead, the monetary reaction function represents the optimal strategy from the vantage point of the monetary authority in period t, who takes g t as given. The objective of the monetary authority is assumed to take the form:
3 The regimes correspond to the notion of a Markov-perfect equilibrium. 4 See Appendix A.1 for the calculations.
6 where 2 [0; 1] denotes the degree of in ‡ation conservatism. When = 1 the monetary authority cares only about in ‡ation. The monetary authority chooses (c t ; h t ; t ; R t ) to maximize (9) subject to (6)-(8) taking as given fc t+j ; h t+j ; t+j ; R t+j ; g t+j 1 g for j 1.
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Fiscal leadership. In the second regime, the …scal authority decides before the monetary authority in each period. The government in period t has to choose (c t ; h t ; t ; g t ; R t )
to maximize (1) subject to (6)- (8), the monetary reaction function, and taking as given fc t+j ; h t+j ; t+j ; R t+j ; g t+j g for j 1. The monetary reaction function, of course, is the same as in the …rst regime, because the monetary authority faces the same economic environment in the two regimes.
Policy evaluation
After calibrating the model, we provide an assessment of the implications of in ‡ation conservatism. We assess the implications on both the steady state and the response to shocks.
Calibration
As in Adam and Billi (2008) household preferences are assumed to take the form:
where ! h > 0, ! g 0 and ' 0 denotes the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. We set equal to 0:9913 quarterly, to imply a steady-state real interest rate of 3:5 percent annual.
is equal to 6, so that the mark-up over marginal costs is 20 percent. is equal to 17:5, 7 percent of the time and spend 20 percent of output on public goods. 6 The technology shock has z equal to 0:95 and z equal to 0:6 percent quarterly, while the mark-up shock has equal to 0:96 and equal to 2:1 percent quarterly.
The implications of in ‡ation conservatism
Based on the calibrated model, …gure 1 shows the e¤ects of in ‡ation conservatism on welfare, measured as the welfare equivalent consumption loss relative to the Ramsey plan. 7 In the …gure, lack of in ‡ation conservatism ( = 0) results in a welfare loss of more than 8 percentage points in the two policy regimes. But if we consider in ‡ation conservatism, welfare di¤ers greatly across the two regimes. With simultaneous policy, a value of slightly below 1 reduces the welfare loss to less than 5 percentage points. However, if rises to 1, the welfare loss rises back to about 8 percentage points. With …scal leadership, by contrast, the welfare loss falls all the way to zero when rises to 1. The reason is that, in the …scal leadership regime, in ‡ation conservatism imposes discipline on public spending.
[ Figure 1 about here]
To illustrate the …scal discipline, …gure 2 shows the e¤ects of in ‡ation conservatism on the equilibrium allocation in the two policy regimes and in the Ramsey plan. 8 If the level of in ‡ation conservatism is moderate ( = 0:7), in ‡ation and output (GDP) are high, compared to the Ramsey plan. The high output is achieved via excessive public spending. And public spending crowds out private consumption. With simultaneous policy, raising results in further crowding out of private consumption. But with …scal leadership, raising to 1 eliminates 6 The calculation of the weights can be found in the appendix of Adam (2011) , after imposing bonds are in zero aggregate net supply.
7 Let u(c; h; g) denote the period utility in the Ramsey steady state and u(c A ; h A ; g A ) the period utility in the steady state of an alternative policy regime. The …gure shows the percent fall in consumption making the Ramsey steady state welfare equivalent to the alternative policy regime, i.e., u(c (1 ) ; h; g) = u(c A ; h A ; g A ). [ Figure 2 about here]
Regarding the dynamics of the economy, …gure 3 shows the response after a negative technology shock. The shock size is one standard deviation. On impact, private consumption, public spending and output all fall about 2 percentage points below steady state, while in‡ation remains at steady state. The response is the same both for the Ramsey plan and for the …scal leadership regime with full in ‡ation conservatism. At the same time, the response to a mark-up shock is minimal, as …gure 4 shows. In fact, the deviation from steady state is less than 0.2 percent and is in the …rst few quarters only. Overall, in the …scal leadership regime, full in ‡ation conservatism practically eliminates any volatility in the economy due to technology shocks and mark-up shocks.
[ Figure 3 and 4 about here]
Conclusion
In this paper, we reconsider the role of in ‡ation conservatism in a setting with endogenous …scal policy and distortionary taxation. The analysis clari…es that the desirability of in‡ation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions. In particular, full conservatism, which implies zero in ‡ation in equilibrium, is optimal only in the case of …scal leadership, arguably the most plausible case. Still, we do not take into account government debt accumulation. As a consequence, …scal policy is not allowed to smooth taxes, and the associated distortions, over time. Incorporating these features into the analysis seems an interesting task for future research.
A Appendix
This appendix derives the …scal reaction function and the monetary reaction function. In doing so, let j t for j = 1 to 3 denote the Lagrange multipliers on (6)- (8), respectively.
A.1 Fiscal reaction function
The …rst-order conditions of the …scal authority's problem are
Using this result and (14) to eliminate 3 t in (12) gives the …scal reaction function
A.2 Monetary reaction function
The …rst-order conditions of the monetary authority's problem are
Equation (18) implies 2 t = 0. While (15)- (17) give, respectively,
Then (19) and (21) imply
While (20) and (21) imply
Equating (22) and (23) gives the monetary reaction function 
